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Abstract 
In the 2000s, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have proceeded to revise their outdated laws regulating 
the movements of people across national borders. Such timely legislative action has been deemed to be 
the result of the European Union’s external policy on transferring its restrictive migration governance 
to neighbouring countries. The legal framework emerging from the Maghreb reforms does appear to 
have broadly converged towards restrictive migratory policies. However, the paper outlines how such 
policy convergence has been in part achieved through a localisation of international legal norms, 
which did not result in an approximation to international and EU law. Ultimately, the paper sets out to 
show how migratory laws in the Maghreb do play a part in the externalisation of the EU’s border 
control, but do so by actually departing from the same international and EU normative standards that 
the Union has been promoting to its Maghreb neighbours. 
Keywords: 
Migration; Maghreb; international law; norm localisation; European Union.  
 
 1 
Introduction 
In the 2000s, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria have, one after the other, proceeded to revise their 
outdated laws regulating the movements of people across national borders. Hence, in 2003 Morocco 
adopted the Law no. 02-03
1
 on the “entry and stay of foreigners and on the irregular immigration and 
emigration,” repealing a number of legal acts dating back to the French protectorate. One year later, in 
Tunisia, the Organic Law no. 2004-6
2
 amended some migration-related provisions included in the 
1975 law on passports and travel documents.
3
 Lastly, in 2008 Algeria first adopted a new law on the 
“conditions of entry, stay and circulation of foreigners”,4 replacing a previous law from 1966,5 and 
then, in 2009, amended the penal code
6
 introducing, inter alia, the crimes of illicit traffic of migrants 
and illicit exit from the country for both nationals and foreigners.  
Such timely legislative action has been deemed to be the result of the pressures exerted by the 
European Union (EU), to curb migrant arrivals on its territory. In particular, it has been linked to the 
external dimension of the EU migration policies,
7
 which, with a view of involving third (sending and 
transit) countries in the management of migration flows, has been working towards the transfer of 
international and EU migration-related rules and practices.
8
 These recent legal changes would then 
also be the result of the EU’s alleged norm-based foreign policy, deemed to have influenced the 
Maghreb states’ legislative policies on the movements of people. 
Indeed, the legal framework emerging from these reforms appears to have broadly converged 
towards the same restrictive legal trends that are identifiable in Europe, as well at the international 
level. More specifically, as argued by Perrin,
9
 with these reforms the Maghreb countries have 
converged toward global trends of migrant criminalisation and border securitising. The emerging legal 
framework in the Maghreb is then likely to curb migratory flows heading to Europe. 
However, an examination of the legal provisions adopted in the Maghreb also shows that such 
policy convergence has been achieved partly through a localisation of international legal norms, 
which, significantly, did not result in an approximation to international and EU standards. Therefore, 
the main argument of this paper is that, notwithstanding the EU’s efforts at transferring its own rules 
and practices, as well as relevant international standards, in the Maghreb the achievement of restrictive 
outcomes as to migratory policies has actually been realised by departing, to some extent, from 
                                                     

 Research for this paper was conducted in the framework of the BORDERLANDS Project, funded by the European 
Research Council under grant agreement number 263277. The project is directed by Raffaella A. Del Sarto and hosted at 
the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Florence. The author would like to 
thank Raffaella Del Sarto and Jonathan Zaragoza Cristiani for comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as Julie 
Northey for language-editing. 
1
 Law no. 02-03 on the entry and stay of foreigners in the Kingdom of Morocco and on the irregular emigration and 
immigration, promulgated by the Dahir n. 1-03-196 of 11 November 2003.  
2
 Law no. 2004-6 of 3 February 2004, Journal officiel de la République tunisienne, no. 11, 6 February 2004. 
3
 Law no.
 
1975-40 of 14 May 1975, Journal officiel de la République tunisienne, no. 34, 20 May 1975. 
4
 Law no. 08-11 of 25 June 2008, Journal officiel de la République algérienne, no. 36, 2 July 2008.  
5
 Law no. 66-211 of 21 July 1966, Journal officiel de la République algérienne, no. 64, 29 July 1966. 
6
 Law no. 09-01 of 25 February 2009, Journal officiel de la République algérienne, no. 15, 8 March 2009. 
7
 de Haas, 2005 and 2007:61; Freyburg, Lavenex et alia, 2015: 156. 
8
 The cooperation with third countries in the area of migration management and border control has taken different forms 
ranging from operational arrangements to readmission agreements, development assistance and foreign direct 
investments. On the emergence of the external dimension of the EU migration policies, see Boswell, 2003.  
9
 Perrin, 2015: 194. 
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international and EU legal norms. This has ultimately jeopardised the protection of the fundamental 
rights of migrants in these countries.  
It is, however, important to stress that this does not account for the entire legal framework 
concerned with migration in the Maghreb. Although, by and large, the reforms prove to share a 
restrictive and repressive nature, some provisions have also entailed an increased protection of a few 
procedural and substantial rights of migrants. This is especially the case of the comprehensive reform 
adopted in Morocco in 2003 – though its implementation appears at times erratic or even lacking10 – 
but also of the unprecedented regularisation campaign carried out in the same country in 2014. 
Although contentious in certain respects,
11
 this campaign has notably resulted in enhancing the legal 
condition of about 18,000 foreigners
12
 through the delivery of residence permits. 
The political science literature has investigated the Maghreb states’ migration policies, emphasising 
the role played by the EU and its member states
13
 or their domestic drives.
14
 National legislations 
concerned with migration have been the object of dedicated studies
15
 and comprehensive comparative 
analyses of the relevant laws have also been carried out.
16
 While drawing on literature from across 
these strands, this paper focuses on specific aspects of migration laws in the Maghreb and on their 
positioning with respect to international and EU migration law. More specifically, by theoretically 
framing these legislative acts as a local appropriation of international norms, this paper sets out to 
outline how Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia have legally internalised two distinctive, internationally 
recognised norms: the right to leave any country including one’s own and the criminalisation of 
migrant smuggling. Although inspired by very different values, these norms mark to an equal degree 
the current legal framework concerned with migration in the Maghreb states.  
The paper will first present the theoretical approach framing the recent Maghreb reforms of 
migration law, in the context of the EU’s external migration policies, its associated undertakings at 
transferring rules and practices, and norm socialisation processes sustained by international migration 
fora. It will then move to examine empirically the localisation of the two above-mentioned 
international norms, so as to highlight how the emerging legal framework departs in some measure 
from the same international and EU normative standards that the Union has been promoting to its 
southern Mediterranean neighbours. 
Theoretical framework: migration laws in the Maghreb as local appropriation of 
international legal norms  
A core proposition of this paper is that the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian legislators resorted, inter 
alia, to a localisation of international legal norms to reform their respective legislation on the 
circulation of people. The reference to international law in regulating migration, however, was not 
new, as international legal norms, such as the right to leave, had been incorporated into domestic law 
since the construction of the Maghreb post-independence legal systems. Moreover, the very first 
migratory legislations in the Maghreb have contributed to the strengthening of norms that have been 
                                                     
10
 For instance, access to the Kingdom’s territory can be refused to visa exempt nationals and visa holders on the basis of 
the discretion of security officials. See Khrouz, 2013. 
11
 See Khrouz, 2015. 
12
 Ibidem. 
13
 Belguendouz, 2003 and 2005. 
14
 Natter, 2013; Berriane, de Haas and Natter, 2015; Cherti and Collyer, 2015. 
15
 See in particular CARIM – Consortium for Applied Research on International Migration, Analytical & Synthetic Notes – 
Legal Module, published online between 2005 and 2011. On Morocco see also Khrouz, Ouardi and Rachidi, 2008. 
16
 Perrin, 2004, 2005, 2008 and 2009. 
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codified in international instruments only recently, as is the case of the criminalisation of migrant 
smuggling. 
The assumption that international law has played a crucial role in the recent law-making on 
migration in these countries does not only rely upon the identification in these laws of notions, 
definitions and rules that stem from or present characteristic features of international (customary and 
treaty) law. It is also confirmed by public statements made by government members
17
, and suggested 
by the time frame in which the Tunisian and Algerian reforms took place.
18
 As a result, the most 
recent changes in migratory legislation in the Maghreb appear as having engaged with international 
law, and this then emerges as a key reference in the law drafting process. 
Diffusion of law and norm diffusion 
An extensive body of literature, mainly developed by legal and international relations scholars,
19
 has 
identified and investigated the diffusion of law – under different labels such as circulation, 
transplantation and transposition – and, most importantly here, the diffusion of European and 
international norms. Whereas the spread of ideas is a shared broad interest, legal scholars have mostly 
focused on the municipal law of states and on the interactions between legal orders, including 
customary and non-state law.
20
 International relations scholars have instead paid greater attention to 
the worldwide circulation of international and EU norms, as reflecting the pervasive (normative) 
power of international and regional institutions, and then affecting more genuinely political settings on 
the global scale.  
Initially concerned with norm diffusion at the level of the international system,
21
 international 
relations scholarship has then shifted its focus to the impact of international norms on domestic 
political systems. Several political, organisational and cultural determinants have been singled out and 
examined, in order to explain international nom compliance at the national level.
22
 Although 
conveniently reorienting the focus on the domestic context, these approaches have been criticised for 
being excessively static. They have thus been challenged by the concept of localisation,
23
 which seeks 
to capture the complex process of the reconstruction of transnational norms by local agents. This may 
start with the selection of international norms and lead to adjustments of their shape and content, 
rather than merely resulting in norm acceptance or rejection. As a consequence of this process, outside 
norms acquire a “significant congruence with local beliefs and practices”24 and are finally incorporated 
into the domestic legal system.  
                                                     
17
 In commenting on the reasons for the adoption of the migration Law no. 02-03 a month after its entry into force, the 
Moroccan Minister of Interior stated that the law was meant to align domestic legislation with the international 
conventions on the rights of emigrants and irregular foreigners as well as to respect Morocco’s commitments towards its 
partners in the fight against emigration. See Khrouz, Ouardi and Rachidi, 2008: 18. Similarly, the Algerian Minister of 
Interior and Local Communities presented the Law no. 08-11 in Parliament as a response to the inadequacy of the 
previous legal framework with respect to the current reality of the country and the evolution of international law. See 
Zeghbib, 2009: 80-81. 
18
 As regards the criminalisation of migrant smuggling, Tunisia and Algeria ratified the UN Migrant Smuggling Protocol 
(the international legal instrument of reference on the issue) in 2003 and 2004 respectively, that is before amending their 
migration-related legislation.  
19
 The contribution of the social science literature to the spread of ideas and its relevance for study of the diffusion of law 
should not be neglected. See Twinning, 2005.  
20
 For an overview and critical assessment of this literature see Twinning, 2004. 
21
 Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998. 
22
 For an overview of this literature, see Cortell and Davis, 2000. 
23
 Archaya, 2004. 
24
 Ibidem. 
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As regards the European Union, the diffusion of its norms and practices has been pointed out as 
one of the distinctive features of its foreign action, as well as an unintended effect of its internal 
policies.
25
 Though the Union’s very activity of law-making may be regarded as a diffusion of law in 
itself,
26
 much attention has been paid to the processes of Europeanization, through which candidate 
and new member states have integrated the EU acquis.
27
 Far from being limited to actual or 
prospective formal membership, the scholarship on EU external governance has come to highlight 
how the transfer of rules and practices can also reach neighbouring countries.
28
 Through bilateral 
agreements or informal cooperation frameworks, part of the EU acquis, which constitutes the basis of 
the EU’s external action, is then, assumedly, transferred to the neighbourhood.  
Migration in the EU’s contractual relations with the Maghreb states 
The legal basis upon which the relations between the EU and the Maghreb countries are currently built 
on lies in the Association Agreements signed with Tunisia in 1995, Morocco in 1996 and Algeria in 
2002. The approximation to the EU’s acquis is primarily and broadly established in these legally 
binding agreements, with regulatory convergence towards European standards being indicated, 
specifically, as regards trade-related issues.  
In the realm of migration, however, specific formal requirements for the Maghreb countries to 
approximate their legal framework to the EU acquis are not stated. While the Trade and Cooperation 
Agreements concluded in 1976 only established the equal social treatment of Maghreb workers 
residing in Europe,
29
 the Association Agreements that replaced them have instead introduced some 
provisions on irregular migration. They restated the principle of non-discrimination with respect to 
social protection measures, but explicitly excluded irregular residents from benefiting from them. In a 
more general vein, they also included migration among those social matters on which a dialogue 
between the parties should regularly take place. More relevant engagements in dealing with irregular 
migration were however worded in mere programmatic terms. The Tunisian and Moroccan 
agreements indicate that cooperation shall also cover the return of irregular residents (art. 69-3c), and 
the Algerian text provides for the negotiation of readmission agreements to be initiated at the request 
of either party, and possibly covering also third-country nationals (art. 84).
30
  
European and international migration law 
The broadly defined legal basis for the transfer of EU migration-related rules to the Maghreb countries 
runs parallel with the limited legislative harmonisation existing on the matter. This is, in turn, the 
result of the historic reluctance of member states to delegate their legislative competence to the EU in 
this field. Deemed to be one of the last strongholds of state sovereignty, the regulation of migration 
has hitherto known very limited success at the supranational level. Nonetheless, some European 
common rules have been established since the 1980s in the areas of border management and visa 
policies, the conditions of entry and stay for some categories of migrants, irregular immigration and 
the return of migrants in an irregular situation. 
                                                     
25
 See Uçarer and Lavenex, 2002. 
26
 The EU legislative activity inevitably involves a continuous dialogue between scholars and law-makers with different 
legal backgrounds which results in a circulation of legal models and a progressive convergence of rules and interpretative 
approaches. See Benacchio and Pasa, 2005. 
27
 Sedelmeier, 2011. 
28
 Lavenex and Schimmelfennig, 2009. 
29
 Lavenex, 2002: 167. 
30
 Collyer, 2008: 168. 
Norm Localisation and Migration Laws in the Maghreb 
5 
Likewise, on the side of international law, the limited legal framework on migration must not be 
overlooked. Although the diverging interests of countries on the global scale does not make the 
development of binding legal norms any easier, customary and treaty international law has nonetheless 
gained increasing recognition and affirmation. Eventually, even if a proper regime of international 
migration law is still missing, not least because of the lack of a dedicated international institution,
31
 a 
multi-layered migration governance does exist.
32
 This is made up of norms scattered across a variety 
of multilateral regimes, regional and trans-regional treaties and bilateral agreements. 
Finally, the European and international legal orders are certainly not devoid of interconnections. 
Not only are EU rules often embedded in overarching international norms – whose presence and 
robustness may actually facilitate the emergence of EU legislation
33
 – but the very development of 
international standards in the field of migration and asylum has been indicated as an objective to 
which the Union should contribute.
34
  
Norm socialisation, international migration law and the EU’s normative role 
The lack of legislative harmonisation in migration policy has not deterred the EU in its attempts at 
promoting its normative preferences in neighbouring countries. In this case, however, international 
law and legal standards, rather than the EU acquis, have been advocated as the templates to abide by.
35
 
As noted above, this may well lead to an approximation towards EU rules, as these impact on and, at 
the same time, are influenced by international norms. Such normative endeavours fall within the 
external dimension of the EU’s migration policy, which developed gradually36 along with the 
expansion of the acquis on the matter. In this context, a multitude of EU development cooperation 
programmes featuring capacity-building activities has been deployed, with the aim of engaging 
sending and transit countries in a process of norm socialisation.
37
 Through this process of knowledge 
transfer, the target countries have been taught about relevant international norms, and encouraged to 
internalise them, so as to allegedly enhance the state capacity to face movements of people, and 
eventually ensure their cooperation in migration management. Several financial instruments
38
 have 
thus been mobilised since 2001 to sustain this development of the cooperation aspect of the EU’s 
external migration policy. 
Furthermore, at the international level, the limited body of hard law existing in the field of 
migration has prompted the proliferation of soft mechanisms promoting cooperation between sending, 
transit and receiving countries.
39
 These open fora of interaction may also be regarded as norm 
                                                     
31
 Alenikoff, 2007. 
32
 Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon, 2011. 
33
 This is the case of the EU directives regarding the qualification as refugee and the right to family reunification. See Roos 
and Zaun, 2014. 
34
 Council of the European Union, 2005: 7. See also Trauner and Wolff, 2014: 13. Besides, that the Union “shall contribute 
to […] the strict observance and development of international law” is explicitly indicated as one of its goals in art. 3(5) of 
the Treaty on the European Union (TEU).  
35
 Lavenex and Wichmann, 2009: 99. 
36
 For an overview with specific respect to the Mediterranean region, see Cassarino, 2005. 
37
 Socialisation to international norms refers to the crucial process through which a state internalises constitutive norms of 
the international society and so becomes a member of it. See Risse and Sikkink, 1999. 
38
 Among these: Budget line B7-667 – Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Migration, 2001-2003; MEDA 
JHA I and II Programme (2003-2006); Financial and Technical Assistance to third Countries in the Areas of Migration 
and Asylum (AENEAS), 2004-2006; Thematic Programme Migration and Asylum TPMA, 2007-2013. See Lavenex and 
Stucky, 2011: 120-121. 
39
 The UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development and the Global Commission on International Migration 
(GCIM) represent some examples. For more on international migration fora, see Kunz, Lavenex and Panizzon, 2011. 
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socialisation exercises, since while being driven by the search for common views among equal 
partners, they are inevitably subject to the influences of supranational organisations and their legal 
standards. 
These various forms of socialisation to international norms have considerably increased in number 
and activity over recent years. The preparation of draft laws on asylum in Tunisia and Morocco are a 
case in point, as the influence of outside norms is patent.
40
 Yet, these socialisation exercises appear to 
have also played a role in the legislative reforms enacted in the region in the 2000s, featuring a 
reinterpretation of some international norms. As we will see in the following section, this has been the 
case as regards the right to leave and the criminalisation of migrant smuggling. 
Localising international migration norms in the Maghreb  
An analysis of the localisation of two international norms – the right to leave any country and the 
criminalisation of migrant smuggling – can be used to illustrate how current migratory laws in the 
region diverge from some of the international and, to a lesser extent, EU standards that Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia purport to appropriate.  
The right to leave any country including one’s own 
The right to leave any country, including one’s own, is the international facet of the freedom of 
movement. While the right to leave is an international legal norm, the right to enter another country 
remains one of the most resilient attributes of state sovereignty. This “incomplete right” protects the 
departure from any country for both citizens and third-country nationals and is closely connected to 
the right to seek and enjoy asylum. The right to leave imposes on states the negative obligation of not 
obstructing the departure of people from their territories and the positive obligation of issuing travel 
documents. Although separated from the right to enter, the right to leave enjoys a prominent status in 
international law. Indeed, it is a norm not only reiterated by several international and regional legal 
instruments, but also one that holds the status of customary law, so that no derogation is allowed.
41
 
Among the international treaties protecting it, it is worth mentioning the UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights of 1948 (art. 13.2) and the 1966 International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights 
(ICCPR, art. 12.2), considered the universal pillars of international human rights law. At the regional 
level, it is important to recall the Protocol n. 4 (art. 2.2) to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), which entered into force in 1968. 
Like many other basic human rights, however, the right to leave is subject to some restrictions. 
These are worded in a very similar way in positive law, as legal instruments usually require that any 
restriction must be provided by law and must be necessary to protect national security, public order, 
public health or morals, as well as the rights and freedoms of others.
42
 The necessity requirement is 
particularly important since it imposes a proportional test on the restrictions adopted by states: these 
must not only be lawful and geared to protect the mentioned legitimate aims but also proportionate to 
their achievement.  
As in most countries all over the world, in the Maghreb the right to leave is enshrined in 
constitutional texts.
43
 At the same time, however, the adoption of migration laws made lawful exit 
                                                     
40
 Although not yet presented to the Parliament, the last version of the Tunisian draft law on asylum resonates with the 1951 
UN Refugee Convention, while the Moroccan bill appears highly indebted to EU legislation. See Perrin 2015: 209-213. 
41
 On the customary law nature of the right to leave see Chetail, 2014. 
42
 Art. 29.2 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12.3 of the ICCPR and art. 2.3-4 of the Protocol n. 4 to 
ECHR. 
43
 Since independence in Algeria and Tunisia. Morocco included it only in the last constitutional text of 2011. 
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from the country dependent on certain conditions and, most importantly, criminalised exit not 
complying with them. 
The relevant legislations currently in force have localised the right to leave in a way that constrains 
it in slightly different ways. In Tunisia the dated texts that are still in force – the 1968 law on the 
condition of foreigners
44
 and the 1975 law on passports and travel documents – respectively provide 
that foreigners and citizens wishing to leave the national territory have to use border crossing points 
and hold a valid travel document. While retaining these conditions, the provisions adopted in Morocco 
in 2003 (art. 50) and in Algeria in 2009 (art. 175 bis 1 added to the Criminal Code) introduced the 
notion of “illicit” or “clandestine” exits, including outward border crossings carried out with 
fraudulent travel documents or geared to avoid the presentation of official documents. As the reason, 
especially for citizens, for leaving a country in such a way is usually the lack of rights to enter another 
country, these provisions have often been deemed as actually criminalising the exit of individuals who 
do not have a visa to enter, in most cases, a European state. Furthermore, whereas the ensuing criminal 
sanctions may vary – from 15 days’ to up to 1 year’s prison sentence, accompanied or substituted, 
according to the circumstances, by financial sanctions – the almost identical wording used in Morocco 
and Algeria, in making reference to illicit or clandestine exits, supports the argument that these 
provisions were actually well-designed for the externalisation of the EU’s migration management.  
The distinctive restrictions attached to the right to leave, in the Maghreb, appear as challenging this 
international norm in several ways. As currently worded, they in fact significantly differ from the 
general restrictions provided for by international law, by specifically addressing the issue of illicit or 
clandestine border crossings. A look at the stance held by the UN Human Rights Committee, at states’ 
practices worldwide, and at relevant case-law by the European Court of Human Rights, will serve to 
identify some of the legitimate limits on the right to leave, and their scope of action. This will finally 
allow us to grasp the singularity of the notion of irregular exit that is embedded in the Maghreb states’ 
legislations. 
Among the international bodies established by the treaties protecting this international norm, the 
Human Rights Committee is the only one that has thoroughly examined it. On the one hand, the 
Committee provided guidance on the meaning of the right to leave in the context of the ICCPR by 
issuing in 1999 the General Comment no. 27,
45
 whereby it specified the principles that should guide its 
application. As regards the scope of this right, the Committee stressed that it is not restricted to 
persons lawfully residing within the territory of a state, but also extends to irregular aliens (paragraph 
8). In highlighting the negative obligation attached to the right to leave, the Committee also reminded 
states that they should refrain from placing obstacles that “impair the essence of the right”. In other 
terms, “the relation between right and restriction, between norm and exception, must not be reversed” 
(paragraph 13). On the other hand, sitting in its capacity as a dispute resolution body under the ICCPR 
Optional Protocol, the UN Human Rights Committee has examined the interpretation by different 
states of the right to leave, on a number of occasions. The Committee concluded that states can 
reasonably restrict the right to leave of individuals who have, for example, not respected their national 
service obligations or who represent a threat to national security.
46
 
Similarly, states’ practice across the world shows that, besides national security concerns, common 
restrictions to the right to leave are linked to an individual’s criminal or civil obligations, such as 
required measures to execute an arrest warrant, collect taxes or prevent the evasion of a debt.
47
 
Interestingly, in the aftermath of the Second World War, there was a tendency to observe the right to 
                                                     
44
 Law no.
 
1968-198 of 22 June 1968, Journal officiel de la République tunisienne, no. 26, 26 June 1968. 
45
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 27, Freedom of movement (Art.12), U.N. Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, 
1999. 
46
 For a review of these decisions see Havey and Barnidge, 2005: 5-10. 
47
 See Plender, 1987. 
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leave particularly as regards foreigners, as opposed to nationals. In fact, many developing countries 
claimed that restrictions on the departure of skilled and trained citizens were legitimate measures vis-
à-vis the socio-economic implications of a potential “brain drain”.48 
The UN Human Rights Committee and states’ practice point to the most common lawful 
restrictions to the right to leave. However, that a certain measure to limit this right falls within the 
state’s legitimate interests and meets the necessity and proportionality requirements, remains 
essentially a matter of interpretation. Likewise, the appraisal of the individual circumstances of a 
specific case is pivotal to the ascertaining of the legitimacy of any interference with the right to leave. 
Thus, case-law and judges’ reasoning offer valuable clarifications as to the lawful derogations that 
international law can tolerate.  
The most interesting insights into the restrictions on the right to leave in migration-related 
legislations can be drawn particularly from a recent decision issued by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR). Although the case law of this Court does not apply to the Maghreb countries, it 
seems to offer meaningful points of reflection on the issue. While the majority of the ECtHR’s rulings 
regarding this right had so far concerned disputes on tax and customs liabilities or criminal 
prosecution, in the 2012 case Stamose v. Bulgaria
49
 the Court ruled for the first time on a two-year 
travel ban imposed by the Bulgarian government on a Bulgarian citizen, following his expulsion from 
a foreign country for overstaying. This decision then concerns the restrictions imposed by a state on 
the right to leave of its nationals, as a result of the infringement of a third country’s migratory 
legislation (as Bulgaria had not yet entered the EU at the time the Bulgarian decision was brought to 
the ECtHR). In other words, in this case a measure of externalisation of migration policy was under 
the scrutiny of the Strasbourg Court.
50
 
The Court proved to be aware that the Bulgarian legislation had been designed to “discourage and 
prevent breaches of the immigration laws of other States” (paragraph 32) and in particular to “allay the 
fears of, among others, the then member States of the European Union in respect of illegal emigration 
from Bulgaria” (paragraph 36). By contextualising the adoption of such legislation in the visa waiver 
discussions with the EU, the Court also highlighted that Bulgaria had intended to prevent foreign 
states from refusing entry to Bulgarian nationals or from toughening their visa regime in their respect. 
Against this background, the ECtHR held that it might be prepared to accept that restrictions to the 
right to leave one’s own country resulting from infringing the immigration laws of another state “may 
in certain compelling situations be regarded as justified” (paragraph 24). Eventually, however, the 
Court did not reach a finding on the legitimacy of the aims pursued by the Bulgarian authorities. 
Instead, it concluded that the travel ban amounted to a breach of the right to leave, since prohibiting 
the applicant from travelling to any and every foreign country was a disproportionate measure. In fact, 
according to the Strasbourg judges, the “normal consequences of a serious breach of a country’s 
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 Ibidem. In this respect, it is worth mentioning the Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, issued 
following a meeting of international experts convened by the International Institute of Human Rights in 1986. In the final 
recommendations, the international community is urged to consider the establishment of bilateral or multilateral measures 
of protection and compensation in favour of those developing countries suffering a significant “brain drain”. See the 
Strasbourg Declaration on the Right to Leave and Return, 1987. 
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 Stamose v. Bulgaria, Application No. 29713/05, judgment of 27 November 2012. 
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 It is however worth mentioning the Jipa decision (Case C-33/07) issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in 2008 on the compatibility with EU law of a travel ban placed on a Romanian (and also European) citizen as a 
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may represent a lawful measure. See Guild, 2013: 22-23. 
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immigration laws would be for the person concerned to be removed from that country and prohibited 
(by the laws of that country) from re-entering its territory for a certain period of time” (paragraph 34). 
Although enshrined in the Constitution, the right to leave appears considerably limited in the 
Maghreb countries, by means of statutory provisions concerned with migration and the circulation of 
people. In Tunisia, the two laws dating back to 1968 and 1975 seem to be connected to a control of the 
national territory and of the movements of people across it. Yet, the penalties prescribed – potentially 
leading to incarceration for up to a year – are undoubtedly severe and point to the authoritarian nature 
of such control. In Algeria and Morocco, the recent adoption of the notion of clandestine exits seems 
instead to expose the legislator’s intent to meet the EU’s calls for stemming the migrant inflows to 
Europe. 
In this respect, the ECtHR’s reasoning offers particularly meaningful indications as to the 
legitimacy of the restrictions to the right to leave. Accordingly, the relevant provisions in the Maghreb 
seem unlikely to pass the necessity and proportionality test. Even though the aim of preventing 
unauthorised or irregular exits might be regarded as legitimate, the nature of the sanctions foreseen to 
preserve such an aim could hardly be considered as proportionate. In fact, while a (too) broad 
limitation of the freedom of movement (engendered by the travel ban) is at stake in the Bulgarian 
legislation, it is a deprivation of liberty (prison sentence) that nationals and aliens could possibly face 
in the Maghreb. 
The criminalisation of migrant smuggling 
The notion of “migrant smuggling” and its criminalisation in international law are very recent. 
Although drawing from a pre-existing web of international laws concerned in different ways with this 
phenomenon, a clear definition of migrant smuggling and the obligation to criminalise the relevant 
conducts associated with it were codified only in 2000, with the adoption by the UN General 
Assembly of two treaties: the Convention on Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocol against 
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing it (one of the so-called “Palermo 
Protocols”), which entered into force respectively in September 2003 and January 2004. 
These instruments, and in particular the Migrant Smuggling Protocol, require state parties to adopt 
in their domestic legislation specific provisions that criminalise conducts qualified as smuggling of 
migrants. It is thereby intended to provide for the deterrence and punishment of migrant smuggling, as 
well as to promote its prevention, international cooperation and technical assistance to developing 
countries in the field.
51
 The UN treaty law outlines a specific regulation of migrant smuggling by 
addressing several aspects connected to the offence. The present analysis, however, restricts its 
attention to the notion of migrant smuggling, as it is on the very identification of the offence that the 
provisions enacted in the Maghreb express a significantly different view. 
Unlike the right to leave, the obligation to criminalise migrant smuggling stems from a source of 
international law (a treaty) that commits only states that are party to the above-mentioned treaties, 
namely those who have signed and ratified them. This also means that even though originating from 
international treaties, there is no general obligation under international law to criminalise the 
smuggling of migrants. Among the Maghreb states examined here, only Morocco has neither signed 
nor ratified the Organised Crimes Convention and the Migrant Smuggling Protocol. Tunisia and 
Algeria did so in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Nevertheless, in Morocco the facilitation of irregular 
migration is specifically sanctioned by criminal penalties included in the 2003 migration law. These 
provisions appear to have engaged with the international legal framework in more than one regard. 
Also, statements issued by Moroccan authorities explicitly pointed to international law as a reference 
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frame for the adoption of the 2003 law.
52
 These elements allow us to include Morocco in the following 
analysis and to draw some conclusions in light of the international and European legal framework 
devoted to migrant smuggling. 
The set of rules provided for by the Migrant Smuggling Protocol proceeds from the very definition 
of “migrant smuggling”. The Palermo Protocol expressly addresses it in art. 3(a) by identifying the 
basic (physical and fault) elements of the offence in the “procurement […] of the illegal entry of a 
person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” and in the 
underlying intent to “obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or material benefit”.53 Accordingly, the 
international understanding of the activities labelled as “migrant smuggling” reveals itself to be 
intrinsically associated to the illegal crossing of a border and the procurement of some kind of profit. 
The source of the obligation to criminalise such conduct lies in a different article (art. 6), which also 
includes other acts, such as the enabling of the illegal stay of a person in a State Party, the production 
and provision of fraudulent travel documents and the participation in, the organisation or direction of 
the smuggling process.  
Though not devoid of ambiguities,
54
 the international definition of migrant smuggling was intended 
by the drafters to rule out any criminalisation of all those activities providing support to migrants “for 
humanitarian reasons or on the basis of close family ties”.55 Similarly, the criminal liability of 
smuggled migrants is expressly excluded from the scope of the Protocol (art. 5). However, as the 
Protocol sets out only minimum standards, it leaves states free to enact or retain domestic laws that 
criminalise migration-related offences. As a consequence, international law does not prevent states 
from imposing criminal sanctions for mere irregular entry or residence, as well as for activities that 
support migrant smuggling in the absence of any element of profit (art. 6.4). 
Relying on the preservation of national laws stated in the Protocol, in 2002 the then-EC adopted a 
different legal framework with respect to what it called the “facilitation” of illegal immigration, thus 
discarding the term “migrant smuggling”. While being among the first signatories of the Protocol, the 
EC in fact proceeded to lay down its own regulation of the issue in the Facilitators’ Package. This 
comprises the Directive 2002/90/EC, defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence and the Council Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the strengthening of the penal 
framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence. While the former 
provides for sanctioning of the facilitation of irregular immigration, the latter establishes minimum 
rules as to the criminal penalties to be prescribed by member states for the related offences. 
In particular, the Directive criminalises assistance to irregular entry, transit and residence of aliens 
(art. 1.1(a)), but restricts the requirement related to a “financial gain” only to the facilitation of 
irregular residence (art. 1.1(b)). Furthermore, the implications of such legislative choice are 
inadequately avoided by a following “may” provision, allowing EU member states to not impose 
sanctions in cases of “humanitarian assistance”, enabling a third-country national to enter, or transit, a 
member state (art. 1.2).
56
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 The art. 3(a) of the Migrant Smuggling Protocol reads “’Smuggling of migrants’ shall mean the procurement, in order to 
obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident”. 
54
 For instance, the terms ‘procurement’ and ‘financial or other material benefit’ are not further specified, thus leaving room 
for some uncertainties as to the acts and advantages that fall within the treaty provisions. See Aljehani, 2015. 
55
 United Nations, 2006: 469.  
56
 “Any Member State may decide not to impose sanctions with regard to the behaviour defined in paragraph 1(a) by 
applying its national law and practice for cases where the aim of the behaviour is to provide humanitarian assistance to 
the person concerned”. 
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The European notion of the smuggling of migrants is then significantly wider than the one adopted 
by the Palermo Protocol, and allows member states to enact a strict policy towards the phenomenon. 
This is no surprise as the Facilitators’ Package itself originates from a proposal drafted by a member 
state, France, and reflects the national concerns about irregular migration and the urge to provide a 
strong response to it. The very limited reference to a “financial gain” might be motivated by the need 
to capture a wide range of smuggling activities, especially since the benefit element can be difficult to 
prove in criminal proceedings.
57
 However, and regardless of the actual prosecution and conviction 
rates, the mere
58
 possibility given to member states to prosecute relatives, NGO members and 
volunteers providing assistance to irregular migrants appears as an excessively harsh measure. This is 
even more striking in that the previous provisions criminalising irregular immigration included in the 
Schengen Convention (at art. 27(1))
59
 – and amended by the Facilitation Package – did include the 
reference to the “purposes of gain”. The EU legislation on migrant smuggling then exposes its 
prominent focus on the fight against irregular migration, in which it seems to include any person 
involved with foreigners in an irregular situation, all likely to be prosecuted for criminal charges.
60
 
Narrowed in the EU acquis, the intent element of the international notion of migrant smuggling is 
clearly called into question by the migratory reforms enacted in the Maghreb. Criminal sanctions for 
the facilitation of irregular entry, exit and residence were already foreseen, with no reference to the 
underlying intent, in the first migration-related regulations enacted in Algeria in 1966 and in Tunisia in 
1968. It is only with the most recent legislative interventions in the field, however, that the 
identification of such offences came to be openly questioned. In fact, the 2003 Moroccan law and the 
2004 Tunisian reform proceeded to criminalise the facilitation of the irregular entry and exit of 
foreigners and nationals even when performed on a “free or voluntary basis.” Also with respect to the 
Council’s Directive, then, these provisions take a step further by expressly punishing any assistance to 
migrants in an irregular situation. 
The reference to some kind of benefit is introduced only in Algeria in 2009, with a law amending 
the penal code and aimed at transposing the Palermo Protocol into domestic law, as also showed by 
the use of the term “migrant smuggling.” In the criminal provision adopted, however, such intent is 
required exclusively with regard to the irregular exit of people, regardless of their nationality. The 
criminalisation of the irregular “entry, circulation, stay and exit” of foreigners – already foreseen in 
the first regulation of the matter of 1966 – is, at the same time, maintained in the new migratory law of 
2008, though the criminal sanctions were considerably increased.
61
 The focus on the irregular exit, 
along with the irregular entry and residence, with respect to nationals, besides foreign migrants, is 
unprecedented and exposes the Maghreb states’ commitment to curbing illicit activities that are likely 
to facilitate the irregular outward movements of people.  
The legislation on migrant smuggling in the Maghreb departs to a significant extent from the 
international and European legal framework. Several aspects of this legislation are contentious, with 
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 The difficulty to establish the intention to gain some kind of benefit or the existence of an agreement to receive a 
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 A recent study commissioned by the Civil Liberties, Justice & Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee of the European 
Parliament highlights a knowledge gap regarding the criminalisation of migrant smuggling and humanitarian assistance 
due to the limited data available on the implementation of the Facilitators’ Package across member states. See Carrera, 
Guild, Aliverti, Allsopp, Manieri and LeVoy, 2016. 
59
 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the 
Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks 
at their common borders, 19 June 1990. 
60
 See Guild, 2010: 39. 
61
 In particular, the maximum prison sentence was increased from 1 to 5 years by the 2008 reform. See Kerdoum, 2009. 
Ylenia Rocchini 
12 
some provisions even featuring characteristics typical of exceptional laws.
62
 In this context, then, the 
patent questioning of the notion of migrant smuggling appears only as one of the controversial features 
of the framework – yet an influential one, since the entire criminal regulation of the matter proceeds 
from it.  
The relevance of the intent element in the smuggling operations has more recently found 
confirmation also on the EU side. The Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling set out by the 
Commission for the years 2015-2020 announced the reform of the current legislation in the sense of 
“avoiding risks of criminalisation of those who provide humanitarian assistance to migrants in 
distress.”63 Moving the focus onto the highly profitable business that the smuggling of migrants 
represents, the EU seems now resolved to embrace a stance on the issue that is more consistent with 
the international view of the phenomenon. 
Conclusions 
The localisation of the international migration norms examined in this paper emerges as a distinctive 
feature of the most recent changes enacted in the Maghreb states’ migration laws. As a result, the 
relevant legal framework in the region seems to have converged towards the same restrictive and 
repressive trends that increasingly characterise the regulation of migration-related issues worldwide. In 
doing so, it also appears to meet the EU calls for stemming migration inflows to Europe, as the 
departures from North African shores are hindered by law. Moreover, far from being limited to “law in 
books”, this portrayal is corroborated by the action of law enforcement and judicial authorities. Public 
statements,
64
 media outlets
65
 and published case-law
66
 reveal, in fact, how the apprehension and 
conviction of migrants leaving North African shores in an irregular way are common practice. 
Although this enforcement of the law may conveniently change according to political priorities – 
which may be facilitated by the weak independence of the judiciary – it nevertheless shows that these 
reforms have found concrete application, and are not just apparent responses to the EU’s pressures. 
Notably, this localisation of international norms not only threatens the fundamental rights of 
migrants, but also purposely hampers the emigration of nationals. This represents an outstanding shift 
in the migration policy of the Maghreb states, which have most frequently seen the emigration of their 
citizens as a relief from domestic unemployment and an instrument of national development.
67
 Such 
shift may well proceed from the intent of enhancing the authoritarian control over society. Dissidents 
may for instance resort to (irregular) exit from the country as a way to escape the repression of 
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national authorities.
68
 Similarly, the criminalisation of migrant smuggling, as it is conceived of in 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, is likely to affect those organisations of civil society that provide 
assistance to migrants. In this respect, however, the considerable pressure exerted by the EU and its 
member states cannot be overlooked. The accelerated conclusion of readmission agreements between 
the Maghreb and European states in the last two decades has in fact generated, or considerably 
increased, the costs associated to the irregular presence of citizens abroad. Similarly to the reasons that 
have led the Maghreb states to engage in readmission arrangements, the rational for such modification 
of the emigration policy lies in the entanglement of the EU’s restrictive immigration policies, with the 
advantages that the Maghreb countries can obtain in exchange for their cooperation. Against a 
backdrop of increasing pressures from the outside, then, making an instrumental use of international 
legal norms, even though at the expense of nationals’ emigration, may contribute to securing other 
major benefits. 
Notwithstanding the proliferation of norm socialisation fora and the EU’s activism as rule 
promoter, the Maghreb reforms have also sharpened the distance from international law and, though to 
a less extent, from the EU acquis, as regards the right to exit and the criminalisation of migrant 
smuggling. The Maghreb convergence towards restrictive outcomes as to migratory policies is thus not 
associated to legal norm compliance. This is connected to the migratory profile of the Maghreb 
countries, which are predominantly an origin and transit area for migrants (even though they are 
increasingly becoming a destination as well). While worldwide restrictive and repressive migratory 
policies aim at reducing immigration, i.e. the foreigners’ admittance into the state’s territory, in the 
Maghreb, migratory policies of the same nature are equally geared at reducing emigration. As a 
consequence, the EU’s calls to secure stricter controls on migrant movements have been 
accommodated by the Maghreb countries, but with the adoption of legal provisions departing from the 
EU and international legal framework. Without denying the Maghreb states’ autonomy, such 
accommodation appears as the predictable result of the pressures exerted by the EU, more concerned 
about recruiting its neighbours to achieve its migration policy goals than spreading its own and 
international legal standards. In fact, the localisation of international norms operated in the Maghreb 
conveniently matches the EU’s interests in outsourcing border control on persons: the legal measures 
adopted in the Maghreb impinge on the number of departures from North African countries in a way 
that is likely to reduce migrant arrivals in Europe. This is also confirmed by the increasingly vocal 
calls by the EU and its member states for sending and transit countries to stem migrant arrivals to 
Europe.
69
 
Ultimately, the legal regulation of migration-related issues in the Maghreb appears to resonate with 
the conceptualisation of the EU as a “normative empire”.70 As The Union’s “action of transferring EU 
rules and practices beyond its borders” primarily serves its economic and security interests vis-à-vis 
the neighbourhood, this normative behaviour is considerably reduced when it comes to spreading 
norms that run against its interests. In particular, the EU’s normative behaviour that translates into the 
transfer of its model of migration management appears to be limited to those rules and practices that 
fit its agenda of reducing migrant arrivals in Europe. 
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As regards migration, in fact, a tension may arise between reducing unwanted migration flows and 
exporting international and European legal standards that constrain the movements of people within 
strict, yet human rights compliant rules. In the case of the Maghreb countries, such tension, coupled 
with the legislative attitude of autocratic regimes, has finally resulted in departure from the very norms 
on international migration that these countries were urged (by the EU) and compelled (by international 
commitments) to adhere to and adopt into domestic legislation.   
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